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AUSTRALIA'S TAMPA INCIDENT: THE CONVERGENCE
OF INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC REFUGEE AND
MARITIME LAW IN THE PACIFIC RIM
INTRODUCTION TO THE MARITIME LAW FORUM
Craig H. Allent
I.

INTRODUCTION

The members of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal are to be
congratulated for their initiative, compassion, and insight in calling attention
to the August 26, 2001 M/V Tampa incident and subjecting the actions of
the involved principals and the governing legal regime to close and
thoughtful scrutiny. Planning for the April 22, 2002 symposium in Seattle
began in the fall of 2001, shortly after the Tampa's week-long crisis
involving 438 migrants garnered international attention. Speakers for the
Symposium conference, recruited under the leadership of the Journal's
2001-2002 Editor-in-Chief, Kelly Thomas, hailed from Australia, Europe
and throughout the United States. Two key student papers published in an
earlier issue of the Journal provided essential background information and
analysis of the maritime' and refugee law2 issues raised by the incident.
Through their efforts over the past year and a half, the members of the
Journal have clearly distinguished this publication as a progressive forum for
legal and policy questions affecting the Pacific Rim. It was my pleasure to
work with them in bringing the project to fruition.

t Professor of Law, University of Washington, Seattle, WA. Professor Allen, a licensed master
mariner, is a Fellow in the Nautical Institute and a Member of the Royal Institute of Navigation. He served
as commentator for the Maritime Law Panel in the MN Tampa Symposium hosted by the University of
Washington School of Law.
1 Jessica E. Tauman, Comment, Rescued at Sea, But Nowhere to Go: The Cloudy Waters of the
Tampa Crisis, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 461 (2002). Ms. Tauman's comment notes that the IMO
Maritime Safety Committee has concluded that the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime and the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea may provide a possible
solution to some aspects of the problem if and when they enter into force. Id. at 494.
2 Emily C. Peyser, Comment, "'PacificSolution? " The Sinking Right to Seek Asylum in Australia,
11 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 431 (2002).
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At the April 2002 Symposium, two distinguished speakers presented their
analyses of the maritime law issues raised by the Tampa Incident off the
Australian coast. Their articles, both of which incorporate significant postconference research and analysis, follow this introduction. Despite the
organization of this Symposium on the Tampa Incident into two panelsone examining the maritime law issues and a second focusing on the refugee
law issues-the reader will no doubt quickly realize that both sets of issues
must be considered together if there is to be any hope for a workable
solution.
Professor Martin Davies, the Admiralty Law Institute Professor of
Maritime Law and Co-Director of the Maritime Law Center at Tulane Law
School, has titled his written contribution to the Symposium, Obligations
and Implicationsfor Ships Encountering Persons in Need of Assistance at

Sea.3 His article focuses on the legal issues surrounding the duty of rescue,
while also identifying the considerable disincentives for mariners on
commercial vessels to provide rescue in incidents like those which
confronted the Tampa following the foundering of the ferry PalapaL
Commander Frederick J. Kenney, Jr., joined in his article by
Lieutenant Vasilios Tasikas, is a distinguished Coast Guard attorney whose
recent service has been in the Coast Guard Office of Maritime and
International Law and as Coast Guard Liaison Officer with the Office of
Ocean Affairs in the U.S. Department of State. As part of their duties,
Commander Kenney and his co-author Lieutenant Tasikas have served in
various capacities on the U.S. delegation to the International Maritime
Organization ("IMO"). Their Symposium article, The TAMPA Incident:
IMO Perspectives and Responses on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at

Sea,4 provides an "insiders"' update on the response to the Tampa incident
within the IMO and its several committees, while at the same time
suggesting that a true global solution to the problems ship captains may face
in trying to land rescued migrants is not yet in sight.

3 Martin Davies, Obligations and Implicationsfor Ships EncounteringPersonsin need ofAssistance
at Sea, 12 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 109 (2003).
Frederick J. Kenney Jr. & Tasikas, The Tampa Incident: IMO Perspectivesand Responses on the
Treatmentof Persons Rescued at Sea, 12 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 143 (2003).
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Martin Davies: Obligations and Implicationsfor Ships Encountering
Persons in Need ofAssistance at Sea

Professor Davies' article begins with a thorough examination of the
jurisdictional bases under international law for legally compelling shipmasters to provide rescue or assistance to those in distress at sea. He then
concludes that the obligation to rescue can only effectively be given legal
force by the flag state. Some might question the need for a contemporary
analysis to rely on the legal fiction that explains jurisdiction over acts on5

board vessels as an exercise of the flag state's "territorial" jurisdiction
rather than recognize that jurisdiction over such vessels does not neatly fit
into any of the classic bases described in the Harvard project.6 Professor
Davies' conclusion that the responsibility for enforcement will fall on flag
states is nevertheless a sound one. 7 When the flag state responsibility
conclusion is added to the fact that the majority of the world's merchant fleet
sails under flags of convenience, the prospects for an enforceable legal
regime requiring rescue at sea are poor. This is due to the fact that flag of
convenience states are notoriously reluctant to enforce legal obligations
imposed by international conventions applicable to their vessels. 8 While this

5 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §402, cmit. h &
§502(2), cmt. d (1987) [hereinafter "RESTATEMENT"]; see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 317 (4th ed. 1990) (concluding that "[tlhe view that a ship is a floating part of state
territory has long fallen into disrepute"). Article 91 of the LOS Convention refers to a vessel's
"nationality," which seems closer to the mark than territoriality. The basis for jurisdiction might seem to be
of mere academic interest until one considers that refugees on board ships are not treated as if they are in
the territory of the ship's flag state. Cf. Jee v. Weedin, 24 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1928) (holding that Chinese
immigrant did not "enter" the United States by embarking on a U.S. flag vessel). Strict application of the
territoriality fiction would also suggest that children bom on a vessel might claim citizenship in the state
whose flag the vessel flies. But see Mow v. Nagle, 24 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1928) (holding that child bom of
Chinese parents on board U.S. flag vessel while on the high seas was not born in the United States for
purposes of citizenship).
6 HarvardResearch in InternationalLaw and Jurisdiction With Respect to Crimes, 29 AM. J. INT'L
L. (Supp. No. 1) 435 (1935). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, §402.
7 The Canadian court's decision in State of Romania v. Cheng, [1997] 34 W.C.B.(2d) 168, is
instructive. In that case Romania had requested extradition of seven officers from the Taiwanese-flag
container ship Maersk Dubai for allegedly throwing Romanian stowaways overboard to their death in two
separate incidents while the vessel was en route to Canada. Construing the extradition treaty, the court
concluded that the alleged offense did not occur in the "territory" of Romania, and that the court therefore
lacked jurisdiction to extradite them to Romania. The ship's officers were repatriated to Taiwan, ostensibly
for trial.
8 In the companion article, Kenney and Tasikas cite one author's conclusion that the United States
has never enforced the implementing U.S. statute, 46 U.S.C. §2304. See Kenney & Tasikas, supra note 4,
at 150, n.33 (citing Patrick J. Long, The Good Samaritan and Admiralty: A Parable of a Statute Lost at
Sea, 48 BUFFALO L. REV. 591 (2000)). They also note, however, that a U.S. Navy court-martial convicted

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 12 No. I

certainly
adds"-e
fuel' to' the debate
flag
of convenience
statest are
fl-n
r ......
.. o-^
n control
dio flover
a whether
"effctively
flag, as Article 94 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("LOS Convention") requires, 9 the more pressing question concerns what
effect the seemingly inevitable shortfall in enforcement is likely to have on
the masters and crews of vessels that might be asked to provide assistance.
The underlying assumption of the coercive approach, that TwentyFirst Century mariners might not go to the rescue of a fellow mariner in
distress if not coerced by potential legal sanctions, will no doubt sound
unduly cynical, if not insulting, to most mariners. On the other hand, the
post-collision conduct of the masters of the S/S Golden Gate,1 ° the TAV
Virgo, and the TAV Bow Eagle,I" and the treatment of stowaways on the

Maersk Dubai,12 all demonstrate that not all mariners share Captain
Rinnan's professional and humanitarian commitment. In each of the cited
collision cases, the tankers failed to search for survivors following what
turned out to be a fatal collision with a fishing vessel.
Professor Davies next identifies the commercial disincentives for
ship-owners and their masters to be overly diligent in detecting and
responding to distressed "boat people." Unfortunately, the Good Samaritan
whose acts delay the arrival of the vessel and her cargo may be admired for
the deed, but will likely not be rewarded or compensated in the commercial
world. 13 Indeed, in the United States the ship-owner for the seagoing Good
14
Samaritan might well find itself-to use the words of Dean Prosser -

a naval vessel's commanding officer for failing to do more than merely provide provisions to a boat-load of
Vietnanese refugees encountered at sea. Id. at 152, n. 40.
9 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 4, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/121, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397, 21 I.L.M. 1245 (1982) (entered intoforce Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter "LOS Convention"].
'0 Favaloro v. S/S Golden Gate, 687 F. Supp. 475, 478, 1988 A.M.C. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(consolidated wrongful death actions by survivors of deceased fishing vessel master and crewman); United
States v. Hilger, 867 F.2d 566, 1989 A.M.C. 926 (9th Cir. 1989) (dismissing criminal indictment against
tanker's master on grounds of improper venue).
1 The hit-and-run collisions between the Cypriot tanker Virgo and the U.S. fishing vessel
Starbound, resulting in the deaths of three of the latter's crewmen, and the Norwegian tanker Bow Eagle
and French fishing vessel Cistude, which took the lives of four fishermen, are referenced in Kenney &
Tasikas, supra 4, at 152, n. 40.
12 See supra note 7.
13 Under some circumstances the assisting vessel may be entitled to recover in quasi-contract
expenses incurred in providing rescue from the vessel on which the assisted person was a crewmember or
passenger. See, e.g., Peninsular & Oriental Steam Nav. Co. v. Overseas Oil Co., 553 F.2d 830, 1977
A.M.C. 283 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 434 U.S. 859 (1977); Leiton v. ARCO Marine, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 1001,
1996 A.M.C. 702 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
14 W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 378 (5th ed. 1984) ("The Good Samaritan who
tries to help may find himself mulcted in damages, while the priest and the Levite who pass by on the other
side go on their cheerful way rejoicing.").
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"mulcted in damages."' 5 On the other hand, the present "lack-of-insurance
coverage" disincentive Davies identifies is easily overcome. Protection and
Indemnity ("P&I") Clubs are mutual associations, whose members
determine the rules of coverage. If a majority of the ship-owning members
support extending coverage to Tampa-like delay expenses, either by
amendment to the Club's rules or by liberal application of the omnibus
clause, 16 nothing stands in their way. Of course, this merely spreads any
such losses among all the members of the P&I Club.
The absence of an effective legal regime requiring vessels to provide
assistance at sea and the commercial disincentives for doing so might, by
themselves, lead to an increased reluctance by some merchant vessels to
assist distressed migrants at sea. When reports of rescued migrants
threatening their rescuers with "drastic action" unless they are taken to a
place of their choosing, as did the Tampa's rescuees, and of the reluctance of
nearby port states to allow the rescued migrants to be landed are added to the
equation, the combined result is likely to be, as Professor Davies suggests,
that more migrants will die at sea.
B.

Frederick J Kenney, Jr. & Vasilios Tasikas, The Tampa Incident.
IMO Perspectives and Responses on the Treatment of Persons
Rescued at Sea

The Tampa Incident was widely reported and debated in professional
mariner periodicals. 17 Many of those mariners are therefore waiting to hear
the IMO response. Will the response be, like others that mariners have
heard so often, "to study and collect data," as it has been with the piracy and
armed robbery epidemic? Will it simply impose new burdens on vessels, as
does the present regime for stowaways? Unfortunately, initial indications
are not promising.
Early in their article Commander Kenney and Lieutenant Tasikas
distinguish the duty to provide "assistance," which is applicable to mariners
at sea, and the duty of "rescue," which is imposed on states. Because only
the latter extends to "delivery to a place of safety," the distinction may seem
to be an important one for the mariner. The authors further suggest that the
15 See. e.g., Berg v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 759 F.2d 1425, 1986 A.M.C. 360 (9th Cir. 1985)
(negligence action against owner of tanker that attempted rescue of fishing vessel).
16 The so-called "omnibus" clause generally permits the Club's directors, at
their discretion, to
extend a member's cover to a non-enumerated risk on a case-by-case basis.
7 See, e.g., Michael white, The Tampa and the Law, SEAWAYS: INT'L J. NAUTICAL INST., Oct.
2001, at 5.
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"place of safety" phrase might be interpreted to extend to another vessel,
such as a coastal state patrol or naval vessel, where the migrants would be
held while allowing the assisting vessel to depart. Whether professional
mariners will really find attempts to distinguish "assistance" from "rescue"
significant in determining the extent of their response is doubtful,
particularly if, as in the Tampa incident, the persons assisted must be
brought on board the assisting vessel. In such situations, the disincentives
Professor Davies identifies may well deter less responsible mariners from
responding.
The authors also suggest that the migrant disembarkation problem and
the place of refuge issue share many features in common. They conclude
that because the two issues share "important aspects," they are "substantially
linked" and should be addressed "concurrently and together." The logic in
the invitation is tempting. It must be recalled, however, that the national
positions on places of refuge have already lined up behind a "soft" approach
that appears to defer completely to the coastal state, at least if there is no
immediate danger to life.1 8 Some might also worry that problem-solving
energy and momentum for one problem is often diffused or extinguished
altogether when that problem is linked to another less tractable problem, and
key players insist that both be addressed at the same time. The result is too
often that both the number of issues that must be dealt with and the cast of
players spiral out of control, solutions for either problem are delayed, and
any "consensus" solution to both problems might ultimately prove
inadequate for either.
Perhaps future scholarship and debate within the IMO will examine
the relationship between the long-established but poorly defined
international maritime law doctrine offorce majeure1 9 and modem attempts
to apply it in the sense of providing a "place of refuge" for imperiled vessels
or a port of disembarkation for persons rescued at sea. Force majeure, a
protean concept, takes on many applications, particularly in the commercial
law context, where it may. be raised as a defense to a breach of contract
action. It has been cited as grounds for exempting vessels from coastal state
jurisdiction. 20 The LOS Convention recognizes it, along with distress or the
rendering of assistance,21 as one of the three recognized exceptions to the
IS See Kenney & Tasikas, supra note 4, at 170.
See MYRES S. McDOUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 110 & m.

61-62 (rev. ed. 1987); D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 853-58 (2d ed. 1982).
20 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, §512, reporter's note 5.
2 The United States takes the position that there is a limited "right of assistance entry" into the
territorial sea of another nation. See U.S. Senate, Treaty Doc. 103-39, United Nations Convention on the
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ordinary rule that a vessel's transit must be continuous and expeditious to
qualify the vessel for the right of innocent passage.22 Some U.S. statutes
recognize a force majeure exception to their application.23 Not all force
majeure cases implicate immediate danger to human life. Indeed, many may
endanger property only, as when a vessel's crew has been evacuated, but the
vessel itself is still in danger. Whether the customary law norm might be
expanded (or codified in conventional law) to serve as a justification for
entry into a foreign port or internal waters--other than in cases where
necessary to preserve human life24 - without prior express or implied port
state authorization, is an intriguing 2 uestion relevant to both Tampa-like
cases and the places of refuge debate.
Rear Admiral Pluta's remarks to the IMO on behalf of the United
States, quoted in Cdr. Kenney's and Lt. Tasikas' article,26 dim the hopes for
a "Norwegian solution" to Tampa-like incidents, described by the authors.
The U.S. position, mirroring U.S. practice for more than two decades, 27 calls

for cooperation and coordination but ultimately leaves the final decision
regarding disembarkation with the port state. Cynics would say this is
merely another example of an offer to substitute process for a substantive

Law of the Sea, with Annexes, and the Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, with Annex, and Message from the President of the United
States transmitting the Convention and Agreement, Oct. 7, 1994, at 101-02 (concluding that "the
Convention provides that passage includes stopping and anchoring for the purpose of rendering assistance
to persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress, thereby expanding upon the customary right of assistance
entry.") (emphasis added).
22 See LOS Convention, supra note 9, art. 18(2).
23 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1905(e)(1) (force majeure exception to rule denying U.S. entry to vessels
not in compliance with applicable pollution prevention laws). See also The Brig Concord, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 387 (1815) (holding that "[w]here goods are brought by superior force, or by inevitable necessity,
into the United States, they are not deemed to be so imported").
24 ROBIN R. CHURCHILL & A. VAUGHN LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 63 (3d ed. 1999).
25 One of the prominent "place of refuge" incidents in recent U.S. history involved the
cruise ship
M/S Prinsendamoff the coast of southern Alaska. In October 1980, after the vessel was badly damaged by
fire and the Coast Guard (working with the T/V Williamsburgh, the S/S Portland and the S/S Sohio
Intrepid) rescued the passengers and crew, the owners requested permission from the Coast Guard to bring
the vessel in to sheltered waters to permit salvage. See U.S. Coast Guard Message 102231Z Oct. 80 (from
Commander, Coast Guard District 17 to Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard) (copy on file with the author).
The Coast Guard denied the request, and the vessel later sank. For an account of the rescue operations see
Josh Eppinger, The Prinsendam Fire: History's Greatest Sea Rescue, POPULAR MECHANICS, Apr. 1981, at
102-05, 211-12, 214-16, 218-19.
26 Kenney & Tasikas, supra note 4, at 166, n.I15.
2' See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (holding that the program created
by the President for repatriation of Haitian migrants interdicted beyond the territorial sea of United States
does not violate the Immigration and Nationality Act or the U.N. Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees); see also Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that, as a matter of U.S.
law, a president may, in exercise of the president's foreign affairs powers, indefinitely detain Cuban
refugees even if such action violates customary intemational law).
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provides no basis for mariners to predict
rule. Of course, the processTTitself
arguably mcets the three goals set
p
the outcome. Although the
out in IMO Resolution 920(22),2 any approach that requires little more than
coordination and cooperation and leaves the final decision squarely with the
coastal state, to be exercised on a case-by-case basis, may lead to delays by
29
By
coastal states that might impede or discourage rescue efforts.

substituting ad hoc, case-by-case decisions for a rule of law, the approach
also increases the probability that some decisions will be made on domestic
political and economic grounds that might fail to adequately take into
account the interests of the migrants or their rescuers or the shared interest in
fair and humane treatment of distressed persons.
Despite the shortcomings in the United States/Australian approach,
the "Norwegian solution," which would give discretion to the master of a
rescuing vessel to decide where persons may be landed-characterized by
Kenney and Tasikas as "turning international law on its head" -is fraught
with so many difficulties that any convention that incorporated such a rule is
30
not likely to attract the ratifications necessary for its success. The "nearest
suitable port" standard incorporated in the "Norwegian solution" also fails to
address situations like those on the Tampa, where the rescuees threaten the
master if they are not taken to a place of their choosing. As Admiral Pluta

warns in his remarks, such a rule might be used by the smuggling vessel
itself as grounds for landing the vessel's migrants, thus triggering the port
state's international responsibility to process any applications for asylum.
Unless the international community is willing to accept something analogous
to a free trade zone,31 in which rescued persons landed are not yet deemed
28 The second goal in the Resolution-that "ships which have retrieved persons in distress at sea are
able to deliver the survivors to a place of safety" is perhaps the most contentious. See Review of Safety
Measures and Proceduresfor the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, 22nd Sess., Agenda Item 8, IMO
Assembly Res. A.920(22) (Nov. 2001).
29 The approach appears to be the one taken in Australia's "Protocol for Commercial Shipping
Rescuing Persons at Sea in or Adjacent to the Australian Search and Rescue Region," described in Davies,
supra note 3, at 11, n. 6. Mariners and ship-owners reading the Protocol may understandably feel
overwhelmed by the information demands imposed on a rescuing vessel. For example, the rescuing vessel
is expected to provide Australian authorities the name, flag, description and call sign of the distressed
vessel, her port of origin and destination, and the number of rescued persons and the countries where those
persons have a right of entry. See Australian Department of Transport and Regional Services, Protocolfor
Commercial ShippingRescuing Personsat Sea In or Adjacent to the Australian Search and Rescue Region,
availableat http://www.dotars.gov.au/transinfra/searescueprotocol.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2002).
3o Consider, for example, the International Convention Relating to Stowaways, which was drafted in
1957 but has still not yet attracted sufficient ratifications to enter into force. 6 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY,
Doc. No. 2-4 (Frank L. Wiswall ed., 7th rev. ed. 2001).
3' Foreign or domestic merchandise in designated "free trade zones" in the United States are
generally exempt from customs laws while so stored. See 19 U.S.C. § 81c (2000). Such an approach to
migrants rescued at sea would likely be flatly rejected by the international human rights community, which
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officially arrived for purposes of its immigration laws, 32 some potential
destination states are likely to actively oppose the landing of distressed or
rescued migrants.
III.

POST-SCRIPT

Most would agree that the world has changed in many ways since
August 26, 2001, when the Tampa went to the rescue of the Palapa I
passengers and crew. Sadly, it appears that many of the desperate rescuees,
whose attempted migration to Australia set the Tampa crisis in motion, have
abandoned their efforts and returned to Afghanistan.33 Meanwhile, the
incidence of terrorism and other threats to vessels is on the rise, creating
further disincentives for merchant vessels to answer calls for assistance.
Within the United States, the 107th Congress enacted legislation that will
dramatically change the government organization and procedures for
maritime security. Meanwhile, decrepit and overloaded vessels continue to
come to grief, with appalling loss of life and damage to the marine
environment.
A.

The Terror Factor

In the months since the Tampa Incident, the United States suffered the
devastating attacks of September 11, 2001, the Taliban were forcibly
removed from power, and ninety-two Indonesians and tourists from
Australia, Belgium, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy,
Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden,
Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United States were killed in the October 12,
2002 terrorist attack on two Indonesian nightclubs on the resort island of
Bali. On October 6, 2002, terrorists on board an explosives-laden small boat
attacked the French tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen, not far from
Aden, where the U.S. destroyer U.S.S. Cole was similarly attacked two years
would almost certainly view it as an attempt to mask what would really amount to refoulement or acts of
unlawful expulsion.
32 One notorious example of such a practice by the United States is reflected in the use of the leased
Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d. 55 (D.D.C. 2002) (suit
on behalf of aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the
base, which is outside sovereign jurisdiction of the United States).
33 See Afghan Asylum Seekers "Forced to Leave" Camp, CNN.com News, Nov.
18, 2002, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/auspac/l 1/1 8/story.aus.refugees/index.hml" (reporting that 113
of the Afghan asylum seekers returned home to Kabul from Nauru, saying they were forced to leave by the
unbearable conditions at the Nauru detention camp).
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where human smuggling operations are common-have been on the rise for

more than a decade. 35 One can reasonably expect that mariners will grow
increasingly wary of approaching any unidentified boat and might well be
forced to wonder whether36an apparent distress call is really just a ruse for
robbery or terrorist attack.
B.

"HomelandSecurity": New Primacy?
The reader might also note that the U.S. Coast Guard, the nation's

maritime search and rescue agency, will soon find a new organizational
home in the Department of Homeland Security, established in the final days
of the 107'h Congress.37 At the same time, the Coast Guard will be
challenged with implementing the Maritime Transportation Antiterrorism
Act of 2002. 38 Whether the changes will undermine the Coast Guard's
historical search and rescue operations was enough of a concern to Congress
that it included language expressly instructing the new Secretary to guard
against the risk.39 In the meantime, the Coast Guard continues to carry out
the nation's long-standing policy of interdicting U.S.-bound migrants at
sea-primarily Haitians and Dominicans on the east coast and Chinese

nationals on the west coast-often repatriating them before they land on
U.S. soil.40 A brief filed by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
opposing the release of more than 200 Haitian migrants who swam ashore

34 One crewman on the Limburg was killed and 90,000 barrels of oil were released as a result of the
bomb damage. See Yemen Acknowledges Terror Attack on French Tanker, USA TODAY.COM, Oct. 24,
2002, at http://www.usatoday.corn/news/world/2002-10-17-yemen-attack x.htm.
35 See generally JOHN S. BURNETT, DANGEROUS WATERS: MODERN PIRACY AND TERROR ON THE
HIGH SEAS (2002) (documenting the resurgence of piracy and other armed attacks against ships, with
particular emphasis on the Straits of Singapore and Malacca and the South China Sea).
36 See, e.g., Sean Young, Seafarers Face Threats of Terrorism, AP Online, Oct. 23, 2002 available
at 2002 WL 101565408 (reporting data from the International Maritime Bureau in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
documenting 271 attacks on ships between January and September of 2002).
37 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
38 See Maritime Transportation Antiterrorism Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064
(2002).
31 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, supra note 37, §888(e)(1) ("Preserving Coast Guard Mission
Performance").
4o See Alfonso Chardy, Coast Guard Intercepts, Repatriates238 Haitians,MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 14,
2002 available at 2002 WL 102931189. The U.S. policy is described in the article by Commander Kenney
and Lieutenant Tasikas; see also United Nations G.A. Res. 55/74, 15 (2000) (reaffirming that "voluntary
repatriation is the preferred solution to refugee problems," but only when it can be accomplished with
safety and dignity).

JANUARY 2003

INTRODUCTION: MARITIME LAWFORUM

from their fifty foot boat near Key Biscayne, Florida on October 29, 2002,41
raised "national security" concerns over the possibility that Haiti is now also
serving as a gateway for migrants from other nations to enter the United
States.42
C.

Places ofRefuge: An Issue That Will Not Go Away

In November 2002, the "places of refuge" debate was back on the
front pages of the world's news services as salvage tugs responded to the
crippled tanker Prestige, which developed a hull fracture while off the
Atlantic coast of Spain en route to Gibraltar. Spain refused requests to bring
the twenty-six-year-old tanker, laden with 77,000 tons of fuel oil, into
sheltered waters to pump off the cargo.43 The vessel was towed to sea,
where it eventually sank. The Prestige flew the flag of The Bahamas, which,
as Professor Davies reminds us, is one of the leading flag of convenience
states.
It is still too early to predict what effect the Prestige incident will
have on the places of refuge debate at the IMO. Shortly after the incident,
William O'Neal, Secretary General of the IMO, defended the Organization's
record on marine safety and pollution prevention, arguing that calls for
tightening the existing legal regime "can be handled fairly readily under the
existing work programme" of the IMO. 44 Paul Slater, Chairman of First
International Shipping Corporation, was not convinced. He criticized the
IMO for failing to take a leadership role in the Prestigeincident, labeled the
Organization "toothless," and described it as a "bureaucratic elephant
moving at the pace of a snail.'45 A number of European states agree that the
IMO is moving too slowly, at least on standards for tankers. Soon after the
sinking of the Prestige,Spain, France, and Portugal all moved to ban singlehull tankers from their exclusive economic zones, despite the fact that such
41 See Boatload of'Haitians Swarms Ashore in Florida, CNN.coM NEWS, Oct. 29, 2002 at

http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/South/10/29/haitians.ashore/index.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
42 See Alfonso Chardy, Holding Haitians a Security Issue, INS BriefDetails, MIAMI HERALD, Nov.
13, 2002 available at 2002 WL 102931046; see also Arthur C. Helton & Dessie P. Zagorcheva,
Globalization, Terror and the Movements of People, 36 INT'L L.. 91, 92 (2002) (concluding that a "serious
side effect of the [September 11 th] attacks against the United States has been a backlash against migrants
and asglum seekers").
See Ciaran Giles, Official Blames Companyfor Spill, AP Online, Nov. 23, 2002, available at 2002
WL 103439311 (reporting that SMIT Salvage "repeatedly asked for a port where it could repair the ship or
remove the 20 million gallons of fuel oil inside").
44 See IMO Remains Bedrock of Global Standards, Lloyds List Int'l, Dec. 2, 2002, available at 2002
WL 26532026.
45 id.
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tankers comply with the existing MARPOL 46 standards developed through
the IMO. 47 Thus it seems likely that the places of refuge debate will be
lengthy and contentious, and that any attempt to link the Tampa issues to the
place of refuge debate will only delay resolution of either.
D.

And Overloaded Vessels Keep on Sinking

At nearly the same time the Afghan migrants recovered by the Tampa
returned to their war-scarred homeland, the world was reminded yet again of
the perils of the sea and the frailty of many of the vessels on which
commuters rely when the M/S Joola, an overloaded Senegalese ferry,
capsized and took 970 of her 1034 passengers to their death.4 8 Half a world
away, and not far from the scene of the Tampa Incident, an Indonesian ferry
carrying more than 180 passengers sank shortly after leaving Abon. 49 At the
time the story was released, at least fifty of the ferry's passengers were still
missing at sea. Had Captain Rinnan and his crew on Tampa been on watch
nearby, the missing passengers might well have found rescue at the hands of
mariners whose moral courage, compassion and seamanship skill brought
tremendous credit to their ancient profession.

46 International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships, (MARPOL 73/78),
IMCO Doc. MP/CONF/WP 35, Nov. 2, 1973, reprintedin 12 I.L.M. 1319 (1973).
47 See Spain, France and Portugal Ban Single Hull Tankers, LLOYDS LIST INT'L, Dec. 3, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 26532064. Such legislation would exceed the coastal state's authority under the
LOS Convention, which, absent special circumstances, limits the Coastal State's jurisdiction over vessels in
the EEZ to enforcement of generally accepted international rules and standards adopted through the IMO.
See LOS Convention, supra note 9, arts. 2 10(5), 220(3).
48 See Senegal Ferry Tragedy: Overcrowding Blamed, CNN.cOM NEWS, Oct. 3, 2002, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/africa/l0/03/senegal.ferry/index.html
(reporting that of the 1,034
passengers carried on board a vessel built to carry a maximum of 600, only sixty-four survived the
capsizing).
49 See Dozens Missing After Indonesian Ferry Sinks, CNN.CoM NEWS, Nov. 4, 2002, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/l 1/03/indonesia.ferry/index.htail.
The
story

solemnly notes that "[m]illions of poor Indonesians rely heavily on ferries to travel around the vast
archipelago nation. However, ferry accidents are fairly common with much of the fleet poorly maintained
and vessels often seriously overloaded with passengers and cargo." Id.

